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Abstract 
With origins in military history, strategy and tactics is a frequently used conceptual couplet in 
the business and management literature. This article reviews how strategy and tactics are 
portrayed, identifying a dominant ‘pragmatic’ account of strategy as an expression of formal, 
planned ends achieved through the subordinate means of tactics. Pragmatic distinctions give 
rise to a range of well-known problems, in particular in strategy implementation stages. We 
suggest that some of these problems may be avoided when the strategy-tactics relationship is 
conceived differently and we elaborate two alternative distinctions: a sociological framing of 
tactics as mechanisms of resistance to formal, controlling strategies; and a processual 
perspective which sidesteps fixed distinctions between tactics and strategy, giving rise to 
more fluid interrelations between both modes. Based on a review of the business and 
management literature we identify key examples of each trope and conclude by drawing 
insights for each account on the basis of these wider discussions. 
Keywords: Strategy, planning, tactics, process, sociology. 
   
  
Introduction 
Strategy and tactics is a recurring conceptual couplet for both business practitioners 
and management academics. In this article, we review a broad cross-section of the business 
and management literature in order to shed new light on this age-old pairing and suggest ways 
of theorizing and alleviating some of the well-documented problems of the strategy-tactics 
distinction (Sull, et al., 2015). We look beyond the widely adopted view of tactics as a 
subordinate set of means by which to achieve vital strategic ends and propose that alternative 
sociological and processual framings of strategy and tactics can deepen our understanding 
and use of these concepts in organisational life. 
In the business and management literature, tactics tend to be associated with lower 
military or organizational hierarchies, portrayed as opaque, bothersome minutiae that lack the 
clarity, rigour and significance of strategy formulations (Kay, et al. 2006). Where tactics are 
mentioned, their utility is often seen in providing mechanisms for strategic change (Nutt, 
1986, 1987, 1989). For example, ‘assertive tactics’ employed by CEOs may raise 
commitment and motivation for strategic redirection (e.g. Herman & Nadkarni, 2014); tactics 
can also provide politically feasible approaches to deliver strategic aims in the context of 
strict regulatory frameworks (e.g. Smith, et al., 2013; Watkins, et. al., 2013); utility providers 
may employ lobbying tactics, including financial contributions, to exert indirect influence on 
regulatory agencies (Holburn, et al., 2014); tactics may be used to sway decisions of antitrust 
agencies in situations of mergers and acquisitions (Clougherty, 2005); or multinational 
companies may seek to gain legitimacy in host countries through tactical lobbying (Stevens, 
et al., 2015).  
As political instruments, tactics are not just available to already powerful 
multinationals or corporations, they may also represent efficacious means for those without 
proper strategic power positions to survive or even prosper. For instance, Chang & Park 
(2012: 10) cite a senior manager suggesting that the ‘strange tactics’ of indigenous 
competitors pose greater problems than those of other rivalling multinational entrants, as they 
remain ‘very difficult … to predict’. A political role for tactics is further suggested in studies 
investigating patterns of influence inside organizations, for example where groups with less 
formal power but superior information may employ tactics to influence strategic decisions 
and thus ‘correct’ deficiencies in legitimate and formal systems of control (Kreutzer, et al. 
2014).  
Others go even further in suggesting that tactical activity may be grounded in overtly 
political intent to the point of being purposefully deceitful. For instance, Gaffin et al.’s (2011) 
identification of tactical efforts aimed at introducing ‘strategic noise’ in crucial periods such 
as CEO appointments indicates that some company boards may tactically communicate 
multiple corporate messages to the press simultaneously to deliberately distract and blur 
shareholder analysis. Similar ‘stealthy or low-profile competitive tactics’ have been observed 
in concealed attacks on rivals aimed at avoiding overt confrontation to lessen the chance for 
acts of retaliation (Chen & Hambrick, 1995); or similarly dissimulating tactics such as 
restricting access to corporate technology and knowledge to discourse the ‘predatory hiring’ 
by competitors of key staff with valuable knowledge (Sherwood, 1990). These examples 
suggest that, far from being a mundane set of activities, ‘tactics’ are used and discussed in a 
variety of intricate forms. However, in stark contrast with the manifold definitions and 
characterizations of strategy in the literature, the structure of tactical forms of operation and 
the sources for tactical ideas remain conspicuously underexplored.  
We tend to understand strategic intelligence in terms of affording better chances of 
success or survival in contexts that are prone to produce conflicts (Gray, 2006: 2). Strategy 
signifies a form of higher-order response in which environmental prompts are addressed with 
foresight, rather than with immediate instinct and where the capacity for politicking signals 
the triumph of reason over impulse (Freedman, 2013). Arguably first introduced into the 
business context in the wake of the game-theoretical work of von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1947), ‘strategy’ has become a pervasive discourse (Knights and Morgan 1991) that has 
come to replace earlier managerial activities such as ‘administration’ or ‘planning’ (Cumming 
and Daellenbach, 2009). In becoming ‘the master concept of contemporary times’ (Carter, 
2013: 1047), strategy propagates an ideology of modern, rational thought and calculation 
(Whittington, 1996) which has come to penetrate almost all aspects of organizational, public 
and private life (Bauman, 2007).  
Tactics, by contrast, lack the formal and rational calculus that underpins and justifies 
a shared sense of how, strategically, reality can be organized and how future steps may be 
arranged (Cornut et al., 2012 : 24). It is therefore no surprise to find scholars suggesting that 
most tactical decisions are merely based on executives’ ‘beliefs’, rather than functional 
relations, and that these beliefs are not the outcome of rational calculation, but primarily 
influenced by what others in the same social milieu say and do (Chattopadhyay, et al. 1999). 
Even on a practical level, disentangling strategy and tactics is a challenging task (Chaffee, 
1985; Cumming and Daellenbach, 2009). Carl von Clausewitz (2007: 80) suggests that: 
‘Tactics and strategy are two activities that permeate one another in time and space but are 
nevertheless essentially different’: tactics ‘teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; 
strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war…’ (ibid., p.74). Yet, such 
distinctions are easily blurred in the context of modern business engagement, for example 
when McNamara et al. (2008: 116) show that even far-reaching decisions, such as firm 
acquisitions, can be considered to be either strategic as well as tactical affairs.  
The strategy/tactics relationship has long given rise to a number of reported practical 
problems for managers faced with the task of devising tactics that are in alignment with 
strategic ideals. This so-called “problem of implementation” (Churchman & Schainblatt, 
1965) indicates a schism between strategic expectations and concrete realities. This divide is 
frequently observed to foster social difficulties and manifest resistance between those setting 
and those impacted by strategy (de Certeau, 1988), and a perpetual sense of stress and 
disappointment as the practical experience of life fails to match up to idealistic, strategic 
expectations (Jullien, 2004a, 2007; March, 2006).  
Yet, despite the vagueness about the definition of tactics and their relationship with 
strategy we find not only that the strategy-tactics couplet features prominently in many 
practitioner and academic oriented management texts (Clegg, et al., 2011; Vaara, 2010), but 
also that there prevails an inherent preference for all things ‘strategic’. With this comes an 
ideology that privileges ‘strategic’ thinking – the abstract, long-term and explicit  - when 
deciding which means and ends to pursue (Kay, et al., 2006). This ideological commitment to 
strategy has also created an entire social stratum replete with idiosyncratic routines (e.g. 
planning meetings, forecasting analyses), insignia (e.g. strategic plans, vision statements) and 
control mechanisms (e.g. audits, strategic change initiatives) that ensure that the scripts and 
roles of strategists remain differentiated from ‘lower’ and merely tactical work and personnel 
(Kornberger, 2013: 105). Knights and Morgan (1990), for instance, trace the genealogy of 
strategy in terms of the division of a military elite occupied with planning to outwit the enemy 
in battle and the mass of soldiers who, like pawns, may be sacrificed in pursuit of ‘higher 
ends’. It is not difficult to identify remnants of this ideological distinction in modern cases of 
strategy used by elites that goes along with the loss of professional privileges in lower ranks 
(e.g. Herepath, 2014), or in examples of strategy discourses that undermine the power 
position of other organizational members (e.g. Samra-Fredericks, 2005; McCabe, 2009; Dick 
and Collings, 2014).  
Given these problems it is helpful to understand the dominant distinction between 
strategic intelligence and tactical implementation not as the natural response to given 
environmental conditions (see also Knights and Morgan, 1991), and thereby to assume that 
the problems ‘out there’ are already of strategic and tactical orders, but that the very 
distinction is necessarily contingent and that it is therefore possible to conceive if it 
differently. To explore how alternative distinctions between strategy and tactics may help 
progress our understanding of how to work with these concepts, we present a literature review 
based on a search for the combined terms ‘strateg*’ and ‘tactics’. Initially yielding more than 
13,000 ‘hits’, we review the ideas and options inherent in the 146 most relevant articles, 
which we read and arranged into three primary interpretations of tactics in relation to strategy: 
pragmatic, sociological and processual.  
Our review findings allow us not only to come to a clearer characterization of tactical 
work but may also help address some of the practical stalemates in strategy implementation 
(Sull et al., 2015) by reconnecting the academic discipline of strategy with operational issues 
(see Nag, et al., 2007), stimulating discussion of a broader conception of managerial work as 
comprising strategic and tactical elements (e.g. Priem, et al, 2011). Also, examining the 
strategy/tactics relationship from different perspectives allows a reconsideration of tactics not 
merely as the mundane complement of calculative strategic initiatives but as skilful 
engagements whose importance and complexity is equal to that of strategy.  
We begin with an outline of three conceptual backgrounds described above even 
though, in our inquiry, these perspectives emerged as a product of our review of the business 
and management literature which populates much of the second half of this paper. Finally, we 
discuss how our findings may contribute to a richer understanding and practical efficacy of 
the strategy-tactics couplet. 
Conceptual background: pragmatic, sociological and processual understandings of 
the strategy-tactics relationship 
We have already alluded to some of these consequences of the separation of strategy 
and tactics, for instance that particular consequentialist forms of argument with clear means-
ends logics are given preference over less formal and explicit claims (March, 2003), or in 
form of the creation of a specific class of managerial (and military) elites who, in making 
strategy, exert control over those dealing merely with tactics. As the wider effects of these 
dominant strategy discourses have already been explored elsewhere (e.g., Knights & Morgan, 
1991; Carter, 2013), our review focuses on alternative ways in which strategy/tactics 
distinctions are drawn in order to elaborate the possibilities for understanding the relationship 
between these concepts in different ways.  
For this we begin with the most common type of distinction which we call 
‘pragmatic’. Here we find separations of the ‘formulation’ of strategic ends from tactical 
means of ‘implementation’; higher geographical or logical strategic abstractions from local 
and specific tactical concerns; and long term strategic considerations from immediate tactical 
actions. A smaller set of literature which we call ‘sociological’ focuses on issues of power, 
control and resistance – concerns which are highly pertinent for organization theory, for 
instance in the context of institutional pressures and organizational resistance (Oliver, 1991). 
Here, tactics represent a sphere of possible reactions to positions of power (e.g. Scott, 1985, 
1998; Jacobs, 1993). A third perspective of strategy and tactics relates to approaches we term 
‘processual’, suggesting that the very distinction between both realms can be the source for 
subsequent confusions and problems. The military theorist von Clausewitz already was 
careful to emphasize that, whilst important for education, military history and theory could 
only limitedly inform behaviour on the battlefield which ‘lives and reacts’ with its 
environment and situation-specific demands  (see also Gray, 2006: 35; Jullien, 2004a: 14). 
Intrigued by the intricacies of changing situational contexts, processual approaches such as 
Jullien’s (2004b) study of ancient Chinese warfare or Chia and Holt’s (2009) ‘strategy 
without design’ elaborate the radical claim that it is possible to avoid a strategy-tactics split 
altogether. We continue with an outline of these three perspectives before, informed by these 
ideas, we turn to a review of the business and management literature. 
Pragmatic distinctions 
The dominant portrayal of the strategy and tactics relationship is ‘pragmatic’. It is 
grounded in the idea that strategy concerns the formulation of an integrative long-term, 
abstract and broad vision, which is to be implemented by the localised mechanisms of tactics. 
This portrayal now dominates academic (strategic) management articles, but we can find its 
roots in the study of armed conflict. Military historian Freedman (2013: 5) for example argues 
that strategic intelligence “evolved through interactions in a complex social environment as 
much as from the demands of survival in a harsh physical environment”. Being strategic is a 
pragmatic quality as planning ahead and cooperating with others - rather than merely 
tactically and individually reacting to specific situations as they come – proves advantageous 
in struggles for survival. For Freedman (2013), the characteristic feature of strategy is that it 
affords successful responses in situations that invite conflict – whether in a group of primates 
or, with much higher degrees of complexity, in the battlefield or in competitive situations.  
One key historical example illustrates a nearly complete (pragmatic) detachment of 
strategic intelligence from tactics: the deliberations of the RAND corporation in the US 
(Trachtenberg, 1989: 303). With the advent of nuclear weapons, the intricate ‘tactical’ details 
of warfare that had hitherto occupied military command suddenly became insignificant in 
relation to purely strategic considerations, in particular to the game-theoretical play of nuclear 
deterrents and the double-bind of defence capability and economic cost. The strategy of the 
Cold War therefore shifted from the question of how to better or more quickly attack an 
enemy to the question of funding (Trachtenberg 1989: 311). This example depicts a near 
complete separation of strategy and military tactics by which political and economic 
strategies are employed to avoid the particulars of military engagement. It signifies the 
victory of reason over impulse, as it requires the insight that war, albeit horrible, is sometimes 
appropriate but that its violence has to be planned and controlled (von Clausewitz, 2007) – 
and as any strategy leading to national suicide (as in the case of actual nuclear engagement) 
would by no means be controlled. The key insight of such strategy was that appropriate 
military tactics had become improbable if not obsolete, but in any case avoidable (non-
)options in strategic calculations (Trachtenberg, 1989: 304).  
Whilst the conditions leading to this particular example of an all-embracing concern 
for strategy may be idiosyncratic to the particular conditions of the Cold War period, we can 
trace similar sentiments in the business literature on strategy. An influential example is 
provided by the work of Porter (1996: 78), for whom strategy is about deliberation; a matter 
of ‘discipline and continuity’ when establishing and preserving unique forms of operation. 
Porter’s work echoes the ideal that in an era of heightened strategic intelligence, operational 
matters are necessary but ultimately of secondary regard. From this perspective, strategists 
must develop panoramic vision, leaving middle and lower organizational ranks to merely 
execute the details of strategic ideas. It is thus mainly in studies of lower ranking managers 
that we find explorations of tactical engagements, such as Rouleau’s (2005) illustration of 
‘middle managers’’ tactics when engaging with a company’s clients.  
The pragmatic view of the strategy-tactics distinction therefore has its origin in the 
overarching idea that rational calculations of long-ranging means-ends relations are more 
effective than immediate reactions. Where strategic intelligence is considered superior tactical 
concerns can be delegated to lower ranks or, in the case of RAND, may be dispensed with 
altogether.  
Sociological distinctions: power and resistance 
The assumed superiority of strategy over tactics is fundamentally upended in a 
second perspective which we term ‘sociological’, which questions social positions and how 
these affect or constrict human behaviour. A renowned example of this perspective is the 
ethnologist Michel de Certeau’s (1988) juxtaposition of strategy and tactics, where the former 
signifies “the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible as 
soon as a subject with will and power … can be isolated” (ibid, p. 35). For Certeau, strategy is 
the preserve of those in formal positions; those occupying ‘proper places’, either in military 
terrains, in business contexts, or in society. From these secure positions it is possible to 
manipulate those who do not occupy positions of power, and for whom only tactics are 
available. Lacking the formal power to change the parameters that define their situation, those 
out with the elite may cope through ingenious, cunning, or deceptive responses performed 
autonomously ‘on the wing’ (ibid, p. xvii; p.37). These responses circumscribe what Certeau 
refers to as tactics.  
From this sociological perspective, the question is not so much one of the superiority 
of strategic actions (even though these reflect the will of those in superior positions), but of 
reciprocity between strategic and tactical ways of operating: the strategic imposing a context 
in which the need for (and the potential efficacy of) tactical actions arises. Those governed by 
strategies are not merely passive recipients of others’ instructions, but they are capable of 
resistance, creatively ignoring, manipulating or misapplying official dictates (Scott, 1998). 
The more elaborate and imposing the strategic calculations of a state, corporate headquarters, 
or local management become, that is, the more powerful these groups are, the greater chance 
of contradictions, grey areas, or blind spots that invite ‘tactical’ exploitation. Tactics serve to 
continually rebalance the power relations as continually diverse sources take part in the 
dynamic organization of a particular social situation and the negotiation positions (McInlay, 
et al., 2010),  
The sociological view indicates that strategy is not merely a neutral response to 
environmental demands, but that the capacity for strategic directives is provided by the 
occupation of a position of power. Although strategy and control can not be separated 
(Knights and Morgan, 1991), those without such positions are neither hapless nor passive. 
Tactics at once signify the precariousness of the lack of strategic places as well as the 
potential to find and exploit subtle and often temporary means of resistance to measurement 
and control systems (Scott, 1998), and thus the insight that power cannot forever be singularly 
and centrally held (McInlay, et al., 2010: 1019).  
This sociological reading of strategy and tactics runs counter to the preference for 
abstraction and formulation that typically accompanies the pragmatic distinctions previously 
outlined. From the sociological perspective, tactics refer to the activities taken by individuals 
striving to profit from, evade, resist, or simply cope with attempts at creating strategic order 
imposed by those with formal authority. For Certeau (1988), strategy and tactics are merely 
different kinds of engagements. Tactics emerge as a response to the formal powers of 
strategies so that both strategy and tactics depend upon one another like two sides of a single 
fracture. 
Processual non-distinction 
The sociological perspective recasts tactics from an inferior, less intelligent class of 
actions to an equal counterpart in struggles of control and resistance. A further nascent 
perspective in the literature pushes this emancipation even further by suggesting that a 
strategic mode of engagement is not so much an intellectual advantage but a practical 
hindrance in comparison to a tactical mode of operating. This ‘process’ perspective suggests 
that the isolation of historical events as a basis of calculation, prediction and action of 
strategic moves is becoming increasingly useless in the face of modern complexity, 
technological development, and worldwide integration (see Valery, 1962: 16; Gray, 2006: 26, 
76). Heuristics based on the past often lead to misspecifications of current situations, 
producing disadvantageous results (March, 2006: 203). Moreover, as Clausewitz (2007: 117) 
forewarned, not only are historical patterns of lesser and lesser relevance, we must also be 
careful with information about the present. His dictum ‘most intelligence is false’ precedes 
later ‘bounded rationality-like arguments’ (Augier & Guo, 2012: 434) and suggests that 
where information is inherently untrustworthy, the pursuit of warfare cannot be subject to 
calculative reason alone but requires intellectual activity that ‘leaves the field of the exact 
sciences and becomes ‘an art in the broadest meaning of the term’ (Clausewitz, 2007: 585). 
Contributors to what we call ‘processual’ approaches see these problems primarily as 
products of the very distinction between strategy and tactics which imposes significant 
problems for those tasked with aligning both sides of this distinction. Processual approaches 
are animated by the idea that strategies and tactics refer to actions with indirect and direct 
effects respectively, and what we might refer to as a strategy is nothing more than the 
continued tactical engagement where affairs are forever re-arranged without imposition of 
arrest and control (Chia and Holt, 2009; Munro, 2005). Here, the strategist abandons her ‘iron 
will’ (Clausewitz, 2007; Jullien, 2004a: 13) and the virtues of ‘discipline and continuity’ 
(Porter, 1996), instead embracing the non-heroic role of keeping options open and protecting 
a capacity for responding to the world. 
For example, Jullien (2000, 2004a, 2004b) elaborates an intellectual background for a 
processual approach through studies of Chinese military conduct, poetry, art and aesthetics 
grounded in ‘blandness’. Blandness indicates “inner detachment regarding all particular 
motifs and all possible motivations” so as to be able to continually redraw lines and preserve 
responsiveness to unfolding situations (Jullien 2004a: 37). This blandness is best achieved by 
a continuing evaluation of both tactical and strategic implications of activity – doing enough 
to deal with immediate requirements whilst striving to preserve a future capacity to act. From 
this perspective, the strategy-tactics relationship draws attention to the indirect and direct 
consequences of our actions, and continuing trade-offs between addressing immediate 
concerns and preserving our capacity for taking action in the future. 
 Table 1 summarises the conceptual backgrounds to the three above perspectives and pre-
empts findings of our subsequent review of the business and management literature 
addressing the strategy and tactics couplet. To enable a discussion of the implications of the 
different distinctions represented in table 1, we will now further unpack each perspective in 
turn through a structured review of the business and management literature.   




Based on this elaboration of the backgrounds of three alternative distinctions between strategy 
and tactics we can turn to our review of the business and management literature which gave 
rise to our identification of these three perspectives. This review was complicated by the 
sheer volume of articles on strategy and tactics and, furthermore, by various complementary 
concepts. One example is the burgeoning literature on ‘strategy as practice’ (e.g. Johnson, et 
al., 2008), which appears to deal with similar concerns about the relationship between 
planning and doing. However, not only has this literature already been subject to a number of 
specific reviews (e.g. Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009; Vaara and Whittington , 2012), we also 
found that the term ‘practice’ was frequently used as a synonym for strategy, for instance 
where strategizing is described as a practice (Johnson, et al., 2008) or, in the more 
sociological works of Certeau (1988) and Scott (1998), where ‘practice’ denotes an umbrella 
concept encompassing both strategic and tactical behaviours. To retain the sharpness and 
inherent oppositional tension of the conceptual couplet we therefore decided to keep narrowly 
focused on the terms ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’, not including the term ‘practice’. We began with 
systematic search for the combined keywords in business and management literature. 
Systematic reviews provide an audit trail and sense for the readers as to how material for 
inclusion in a review was identified and analysed (Lee, 2009; Tranfield, et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, given our concern for both strategy and tactics, we felt it important to search for 
contributions that lie outside of the ‘proper places’ of high profile journals and citation lists. 
A keyword search for strategy and tactics across a large number of journals therefore allowed 
us to identify papers at the fringes which have not achieved ‘proper strategic’ status. More 
generally, systematic reviews have been acknowledged to be relevant to scientific empirical 
syntheses (Rousseau, et al., 2008), offering the potential to develop high quality, impactful 
contributions in management studies (Macpherson & Jones, 2010). 
Our reviewing activity was structured around the key research questions, “In what 
ways are strategy and tactics depicted as related concepts in the literature?” and “What 
implications can be derived from the nature of the depictions detected?” We undertook an 
electronic database search to first identify potentially relevant papers. We searched directly 
on the publishing house databases for journals maintained by Elsevier, Emerald, Sage, Wiley 
and Taylor and Francis, and used the integrative search engines ABI and Business Source 
Complete for all others. We then elected to search all journals in the SSCI “management” 
listing for all accepted submissions up until the 1st August 2013 (no lower date limit applied). 
The search terms adopted were “strateg*” AND “tactic*” in title and/or abstract only, in order 
to identify variants of strategy and tactics such as strategic, strategically, tactical, tactically 
etc. This criteria was adopted with the intention of identifying papers in which the 
relationship between strategic and tactical matters, in whatever interpretation adopted by the 
authors, was sufficiently prominent in a paper’s content as to merit inclusion in the opening 
summary. This was an important practical limitation to impose as searching for the terms 
strategy and tactics in all document text currently yields over 13,000 returns.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 summarises the process we followed when selecting papers on which to base our 
review. Applying the search criteria returned 654 potentially relevant papers across 172 
journals. We then read the abstracts of all papers in order to identify articles in which 
“strategy” and “tactics” (and variants thereof) were used in relation to each other. Eliminating 
papers where strategy and tactics were not sufficiently related reduced the number of articles 
for consideration to 146. We then reviewed these papers in full, with responses to the initial 
research questions captured in electronic form. These electronic notes were then further 
analysed through tabulation and discussion between authors in order to identify the patterns 
and findings presented in this paper. Following Lee (2009), as our review progressed we also 
included further sources (as listed in this paper’s references) that were referenced by the 
papers reviewed or which, more recently, had cited key contributions, in order to deepen our 
understanding of the emergent portrayals of strategy and tactics. 
Literature review 
In this section, we seek to describe detailed arguments, assumptions and implications 
associated with the pragmatic, sociological and processual perspectives of the distinction and 
relationship between strategy and tactics.  
Pragmatic understandings of strategy and tactics 
The majority of papers we reviewed (102 out of 146) can be classified into what we 
have termed ‘pragmatic’ understandings of the relationship between strategy and tactics either 
in terms of strategic formulation versus tactical implementation; general strategy versus local 
tactics; or long term strategic versus short term tactical horizons. We discuss each in turn.  
Pragmatic: formulation vs. implementation 
Most frequently we found strategy associated with direction setting, in particular as 
formulation of plans, whereas tactics was equated to actions required to implement strategic 
ideas in organizational practice (e.g. Bell & Keusch, 1976; Huntsman, 1994; Nutt, 1986, 
1999; Slevin & Pinto, 1987). This formulation-implementation distinction is frequently 
portrayed as a distinction between thought and action where strategy is associated with 
rational analytical calculations, while tactical actions are seen to be more mechanical and 
basic (Hultink, Griffin, Hart, & Robben, 1997; Lant & Hewlin, 2002, Kolb, 1983; Sagie & 
Koslowsky, 1994, Sodhi, 2003). The formulation-implementation distinction also engenders a 
time sequence and causal, means-ends relationship whereby strategic aims are linked with 
wider organizational goals while tactics provide specific means by which these ends can be 
achieved (e.g. Miller & Ireland, 2005; Nutt, 1998a;  Pinto & Prescott, 1990; Sagie & 
Koslowsky, 1994).  
Most authors drawing on formulation-implementation distinctions depict an implicit 
or explicit preference for strategic concerns over tactical means. For example, there is a 
frequently made suggestion that strategies ought to come first while tactics are set according 
to the outcomes of strategic evaluation, decision-making and planning (Appelbaum, Everard, 
& Hung, 1999; Bell & Keusch, 1976; Nutt, 1987, 1989). For Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart 
(2010: 202, our emphasis) tactics are “…the residual choices open to a firm” after a strategy 
has been selected while others propose that strategists should specify boundaries or structures 
in order to constrain tactical work, lest they become deviations from existing strategic goals 
(Giles, 1991; Ronchi, 1980). Preference for ‘strategic’ concerns is also visible in the 
suggestion, by a number of authors, that tactical problems can be avoided by undertaking 
‘better’ measurement. Rather than championing potential improvements in an organization’s 
tactics, the focus lies on improved analysis and calculation on the strategic level in order to 
make more precise guiding strategies (Nutt, 2008; Peters, 1993; Sodhi, 2003), or by including 
contingencies into strategic plans to accommodate a range of environmental circumstances 
and thus pre-empt problems on the tactical level (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010). 
One important variation of the formulation-implementation distinction comes in form 
of cyclical pragmatic models incorporating notions of feedback. Often drawing on Mintzberg 
and Waters’s (1985) articulation of a continuum from deliberate to emergent strategy, 
scholars have emphasized that paying attention to issues on the tactical level may facilitate 
reflections on strategic formulations, and vice versa (Ählström & Sjöström, 2005; Jantsch, 
1968; Sull, 2007, Sull et al, 2015). Such cyclical models go some way towards 
acknowledging feedback processes between abstract strategy formulations and insights 
travelling from the bottom up (Eisenhardt, 1990; Lax & Sebenius, 2012). In cyclical models, 
environmental complexity and uncertainty are addressed through tighter coupling and 
interlocking of strategic and tactical activities (Dinwoodie, Tuck, Knowles, Benhin, & 
Sansom, 2012; Sull, 2007); commitment to regular sampling of the environment and 
adjustment to contingently revise; and ‘fit’ of strategy and tactics based on practical 
experience (Dahlander & Magnusson, 2008; Ghemawat & Levinthal, 2008; Harris, 2000; 
Pech & Slade, 2003, Sull et al, 2015). 
Pragmatic: General vs. specific 
A second iteration of the pragmatic distinction plays out along a continuum from 
general strategic to specific relevance. This dimension can be understood in terms of degree 
of abstraction involved in strategy work, which often includes probabilistic reasoning based 
on analysis of a highly complex organisational environment (Porter, 1996). By contrast, 
tactics are seen to concern practical theorising with the aim of finding context specific 
workable solutions and quick reactions often grounded in individual interpretations of reality 
(e.g. Dibb & Simkin, 1993; Gibson, 1966; Jantsch, 1968; Massetti & Zmud, 1996). Tactics 
lack such abstract and general qualities, their efficacy being contingent upon specific 
circumstances (Nollet, Rebolledo, & Popel, 2012; Nutt, 1993, 1998a, 1998b).  
More frequently, the general-specific distinction is elaborated in terms of spatial 
scope, ranging from broad and systematic decision patterns with far-reaching implications to 
more fragmented, functional and local tactical responses (Bacharach, Bamberger, & 
McKinney, 2000; Clarke & Varma, 1999; Gibson, 1966; Gronroos, 1996; Guiltinan, 1999; 
Harris, 2000;). Here, strategy corresponds with the sphere of influence inhabited by 
organizational elites holding organization-wide responsibilities (Knights and Morgan, 1991), 
while tactics remain the purview of departmental managers ranging down to the shop-floor 
(Donaldson, 1972; Eisenhardt, 1989, 1990; Struckman & Yammarino, 2003). It is therefore 
not surprising to find many contributions resorting to seemingly commonsensical distinctions 
of the sort: It is called ‘strategy’ when it is done by senior managers and we deal with ‘tactics’ 
if it happens on local sites, in departments and teams (Mahmoud, 1975; Meijboom & Obel, 
2007; Rangan & Jaikumar, 1991). 
However, this pragmatic shortcut is frequently upset, in particular as strategic and 
tactical considerations are increasingly ascribed to a wide range of actors, from organizations, 
governments, industries, and nations to individuals - all of whom are described as ‘having’ 
and ‘using’ strategies in a broad range of contexts (see Bauman, 2007).  As we may expect, 
strategies are frequently associated with corporate or organisational level activities, but even 
here we find descriptions of functional tactics such as product launches (Easingwood & 
Harrington, 2002; Guiltinan, 1999); political tactics (Barron, 2010; Schuler, Rehbein, & 
Cramer, 2002); use of social media (Sinclaire & Vogus, 2011) management of suppliers 
(Nollet, et al., 2012); expanding operations (Lilien & Rao, 1979); or in response to 
unexpected events, such as operational crises (Pauchant, Mitroff, & Ventolo, 1992). Some 
papers even address institutional level strategy and tactics. For example, in a paper couched in 
contemporary strategic management terms, Carmeli and Markman (2011) draw on historical 
data to identify high-level generic strategies (capture and governance) and associated tactical 
approaches (saving power, building a stronghold base, isolating, weakening and developing 
forward outposts) to analyse the fortunes of Ancient Rome. Other intra-organizational studies 
have addressed the strategy and tactics of third sector and private organizational partnerships 
(Ählström & Sjöström, 2005) and social movements seeking to exert institutional pressure 
(Yaziji & Doh, 2013). The hierarchical distinction is blurred even further in accounts such as 
Ramanath and Ebrahim’s (2010), who identify NGOs’ strategies of ‘confrontation’ or 
‘cooperation’, each consisting of a variety of tactics, such as ‘street protests’ or ‘budgeting’, 
respectively.  
Moving in the opposite hierarchical direction, strategy-tactics distinctions equally 
pertain to the activities of organisational units, for instance the strategy and tactics of 
marketing (Dibb & Simkin, 1993), advertising (Doyle, 1977), supply chain management 
(Rangan & Jaikumar, 1991), product management (Greenley, 1983), project management 
(Slevin & Pinto, 1987), general research and development (Gibson, 1966), or human resource 
management (Baker III & Feldman, 1991). Even on the level of individuals we find a 
substantial literature detailing personal career strategies. Here, tactics can refer to attempts at 
influencing personal progression (Judge & Bretz, 1994; Keys & Case, 1990; Tepper, 1995) or 
to boundary management activities for those providing peer support (Bacharach, et al., 2000).  
Pragmatic: Long vs. short-term horizon 
A third iteration of the pragmatic distinction dimension is in terms of time. Strategy is 
presented as addressing questions of the distant future, in comparison to the short-term 
concerns of tactics (Giles, 1991; Greenley, 1983; Huntsman, 1994; Lant & Hewlin, 2002; 
Stonebraker & Afifi, 2004). There is, however, little consistency in the literature as to what 
counts as long or short term and specific suggestions, where we find them, are conspicuously 
arbitrary, such as Huntsman’s (1994) taxonomy equating strategy with plans of five years and 
tactics to related three year targets.  
Long and short-term distinctions are further complicated by suggestions of different 
kinds of time entailed in strategic and tactical modes of engagement. Linear notions of time 
typically underlie the possibility of strategic scenarios and planning (e.g. Donaldson, 1972) as 
events can be plotted in abstract, causal terms, and then freely (re-)arranged through thought 
experiments such as scenario planning approaches. ‘Richer’ notions of time, on the other 
hand, suggest that time cannot, in any simple way, be reduced into critical paths (Connelly, 
Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010; La Londe & Headen, 1971). Both tactical (see, for instance 
Hjorth, 2007) as well as strategic processes therefore not only pertain to the linear timescales 
of calendars and project plans, but also in time, that is within the lived experience of past, 
present and future (Bakken, et al., 2013).  
Critiques of pragmatic conceptions of the strategy-tactics relationship 
Above we have described three iterations of the predominant pragmatic distinction 
between strategy and tactics: formulation vs. implementation, general vs. specific; and long- 
vs. short-term horizon. Despite a large number of publications based on pragmatic 
differentiations of strategic from tactical work, we found that the actual distinctions between 
both modes are blurry and inconsistent. What is more, with some exceptions (e.g. Ählström & 
Sjöström, 2005; Jantsch, 1968; Sull, 2007; Hjorth, 2007) we found that most papers explicitly 
or implicitly advocated strategy as being of greater importance than tactics, with tactics 
frequently being portrayed as the problematic detail of rational strategic plans (e.g. 
Churchman& Schainblatt, 1965; Anderson and Hoffman, 1978; Nutt, 1983, 1986; Hambrick 
& Cannella, Jr, 1989). Some authors speculated as to how tactical work may be improved by 
modelling the strategic mode of operating in day-to-day situations to attain a form of tactics 
that is more integrative, externally aware, disciplined and continuous for the attainment of 
objectives, particularly revenue generation (e.g. Cross, Higbie, & Cross, 2009; Kimes & 
Singh, 2009; Lake, 2004; Okumus, 2004). However, even scholars calling for better-
integrated strategy research that builds understanding of how firms tactically react to 
changing conditions remained careful to disassociate themselves from ‘day-to-day operating 
decisions’ (Priem, et al., 2011: 472).  
We also found numerous reports suggesting that the vagueness of pragmatic 
distinctions between strategy and tactics leads to concrete practical problems for practitioners 
(Angell, 1990; Giles, 1991; Goldman, 2001) when faced with the task of aligning operational 
tactics with strategic directives (Takala, et al., 2006). In particular long vs. short-term 
distinctions bring difficulties. Clausewitz (2007) already elaborated the problem of ‘frictions’, 
which emerge in in the time-gaps between planning and acting. Frictions denote the outcome 
of random changes in the environment over time (Paquette, 1991) as well as recursive 
changes that occur when strategic initiatives provoke social and political reactions from those 
affected by mooted activity (Nutt, 1986, 1989). Even seemingly benign interventions aimed at 
generating alignment of strategic and tactical goals such as incentive scheme design (Micheli 
& Manzoni, 2010) and performance measurement reporting (Huntsmann, 1994) have the 
propensity to generate distorting effects in self-organising contexts, for instance when 
individuals adopt personal value maximisation approaches (Schein, 1979). This may lead to 
the paradoxical situation that increasingly detailed strategic designs of control (aimed at 
managing the effects of self-organisation) may become sources of additional complexity 
which generate and intensify feedback processes (March, 2006) – adding further friction and 
thus increasing strategic uncertainty in turn. 
Relatedly, where strategies are distinguished from tactics in terms of their broader 
scope, it has been found that strategic and tactical interests do not always cohere. Local and 
immediate tactical gains may run counter to more general, longer term strategic intentions 
(Angell, 1990; Lax & Sebenius, 2012), for instance when short term measures to boost share 
prices destroy shareholder value over a longer duration (Connelly, et al., 2010; Markides & 
Berg, 1992). Knights and Morgan (1990) also indicate that strategic aims tend to benefit those 
at the upper end of the social stratum, whilst justifying the demand of sacrifices from others. 
Some have therefore pointed to the prevalence of vested interests involved in strategy and 
tactics (Gray & Ariss, 1985; Schein, 1979), making strategic work subject to the “vagaries” 
and “deviousness” of people at all levels of the organisation (Harris, 2000: 870). Others have 
highlighted the incommensurable needs for continued updates of strategic representations 
(Clarke & Varma, 1999; Sull, 2007) and the inevitable time lags and inertia involved in 
agreeing changes to strategy in organizations (Harris, 2000; Sull et al., 2015). In recognition 
of the impossibility of strategies pre-empting future events, tactics have also been portrayed 
to act as necessary correctives; a form of realized direction correction refreshed on a more 
frequent basis (Raturi, et al., 1990), or as a mechanism to account for errors or risks in 
strategic plans (Bush & Gelb, 2005; Ghemawat & Levinthal, 2008). 
Problems also accrue when strategy and tactics are distinguished in terms of general 
reach vs. local relevance. As we have outlined above, both strategic and tactical capabilities 
are frequently ascribed to various units of analysis, ranging from individuals to organizations, 
industries and nations, thus making any consistent strategy-tactics distinction an unlikely 
possibility. Many authors also note that practical problems are an inevitable consequence of 
attempts at strategic abstraction in the messy, fluid, vague, highly complex and not fully 
knowable organizational context (Dahlander & Magnusson, 2008; Kolb, 1983; Lax & 
Sebenius, 2012; Pauchant, et al., 1992; Sull, 2007). Against this backdrop, tools and 
techniques of strategic modelling are argued to foster often unacknowledged gaps between 
their representations and the realities of organisational life, but are frequently found to fall 
short of representing the context examined by strategists with sufficient depth, scope and 
dynamism required to create reliable platforms for prescriptive decision making (Gibson, 
1966; Lant & Hewlin, 2002; Lueger, Sandner, Meyer, & Hammerschmid, 2005).  
As a consequence of conceptual as well as practical grey areas of these pragmatic 
distinctions, labels of ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’ are used quite freely based on situational 
suitability (Bacharach, et al., 1995) and it sometimes seems that one person’s strategy may be 
another person’s tactics (Peters, 1993). Some have therefore called for an academic agenda 
towards greater clarity in the definition of the concepts of strategic management (e.g. 
Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010), while others are developing tools that approach tactical 
questions in the same scientifically analytical fashion that is characteristic of strategy, for 
instance via decision trees for tactical selection, increased managerial intervention, or 
SMART-er tactical direction setting (e.g. Giles, 1991; Nutt, 1989, 1999, 2002; Peters, 1993).  
Such efforts to create ‘more strategic’ ways of instigating tactics indicates the 
mainstream preference for a strategic mode; that is, for rational thought, clear-cut boundaries 
and neat categories of thought, coupled with a dislike for messy and unclear ‘stuff’ (Cooper, 
1986; Nussbaum, 1986: 260). Yet, this begs the question of whether this may exacerbate 
rather than resolve the problem of implementation by further reifying the distinction and one-
sided preference of a strategic mode of engagement over a tactical one when, arguably, both 
ultimately belong together. 
 
Sociological understandings of strategy and tactics: the (re-)production of formal order 
The dominant pragmatic portrayal of strategic ends and tactical means is markedly 
different to a sociologically influenced perspective in the management literature dealing with 
tactics not as a means to serve strategic ends, but as a creative response to political processes 
of those in power in any given situation. This literature pays heed to how strategic positions 
wax and wane in relationship with the actions of those (dis)affected by strategic power. For 
example, in what has been termed the ‘principal agent problem’, the imposition of an 
organisational strategy reflects an attempt at controlling and making transparent the actions of 
managers for a group of owners who are themselves detached from the organisation’s 
machinations ‘down below’ (Buskirk, 1976; Gray & Ariss, 1985). Attempting to maintain 
alignment of managerial activities by imposing a dominant strategic framework resembles the 
initiatives of city planners in positions of formal authority who turn to mechanisms of 
surveillance and punitive action to control ground-level activities from above (Certeau, 1988; 
Scott, 1990; Suominen & Mantere, 2010). However, in distinction to viewing tactics as a 
means of implementing such formal (strategic) orders, they can be understood as a way of 
empowering those who are being controlled when they enact creative responses to mediate, 
transform or resist imposed structures.  
Tactics can therefore exploit the ‘frictions’ inherent in strategic plans, for instance by 
drawing on narratives from outside the organisation to resist workplace change (Cutcher, 
2009) or when employing negotiation tactics to redefine formal structures (Kharbanda & 
Stallworthy, 1991). Harris (2000: 862) identifies a range of tactics that include “laissez-faire, 
external assistance, internal training, coalition formation, structural change and 
scaremongering” employed by managers to evade the effects of restrictive planning or deal 
with increased pressures to plan.  
Tactical responses extend beyond reactions to strategic surveillance and control 
efforts, and may also include covert creative exploitation of overt strategic frameworks. In 
acts of corruption, protest or resistance, tactics can represent amoral responses to dominant 
ideologies, moral frames of reference or sometimes even legality (Anand, et al., 2005; Schein, 
1979; Siegel, 2009). Similarly, they can involve active or passive resistance to strategic ideals 
and associated artefacts (procedures, policies, resource allocation decisions, etc.) that dictate 
acceptable courses of action for those operating within an organisation (Hjorth, 2005). 
Suominen and Mantere (2010), for instance, detail instances of what they call ‘playful 
strategy usage’, which is in most parts quite cynical and critical towards more formal 
prescriptions of strategy.  Such tactics can be generally useful, as unsettling and playful 
actions can act as a change stimulus in the face of a dominant ideology (Elsbach & Sutton, 
1992), for instance, when managers “…use and appropriate the strategy discourse skilfully for 
their own purposes to resist and alternate it, while at the same time articulate and talk in ways 
that do not directly confront the dominant discursive regime” (Suominen and Mantere, 2010: 
239). 
These examples neither portray tactics as thoughtless implementation means for 
strategic ideas nor as the product of objective and formal analysis. Instead, they point to the 
potential for savvy tactical responses as key enablers of the attainment of beneficial outcomes 
against the odds of a dominant strategic context (Page, 2010). Tactics can provide momentary 
efficacy for individuals, in a very functional way doing ‘whatever works’ (Buskirk, 1976), 
similar to descriptions of organizational bricoleurs (e.g. Baker, Miner, & Eesley 2003; 
Gabriel 2002). While the public discourse of formal strategy is there for all to see in strategy 
documents and plans, tactics can remain opaque or lack transparency with regards to motive 
(Cutcher, 2009; Denis, et. al., 1996; Sonenshein, 2006). The potentially disruptive, equalizing 
or liberating influence of tactical responses is reflected in contributions proposing that 
strategy is inherently political and that strategist ought to anticipate the tactical responses of 
those affected (e.g. Vredenburgh & Maurer, 1984). Pfeffer (1992) equally highlights the need 
for political awareness in strategy work and highlights the potential stalemates created when 
an organization solely relies on hierarchical authority when trying to implement its strategic 
ideas (c.f. Lovell 1993).  
Albeit consisting of far fewer contributions, the sociological perspective gives rise to 
an important rebalancing of the perceived importance of tactical engagement. In freeing 
tactics from pragmatic means-ends continuums (from general to specific, long to short term; 
or thought and action), we find tactics portrayed as an important and complex reactive 
counterpart to strategy, requiring much skill and, if done well, yielding efficacious results. In 
eschewing consequential logics, calculation, and clear distinctions for a much messier, 
engaged, and practical way of operating, the sociological perspective of tactics in relation to 
strategy also challenges the disproportionate focus on strategy at the expense of tactics, and 
the value of organizational separation and the frequent preference for those who ‘think’ over 
those who ‘act’. A practical upshot of the sociological perspective is the insight that 
neglecting the intricacies of tactical work when trying to understand organizations or 
formulate strategic plans makes strategists susceptible to tactical manipulation and resistance.  
Processual (in)distinction between strategy and tactics  
The recovery of the importance and intricacies of tactical engagements is elaborated 
further in in what we call ‘processual’ contributions which problematize the very distinction 
between strategy and tactics. Deliberately blurring or avoiding rigid distinctions between 
strategic modes of engagement from tactical ones is suggested to afford a degree of 
‘resilience’ to the problems associated with traditional differentiations between both realms 
(Hamel & Välikangas, 2003). Drawing on the work of T.E. Lawrence, Munro (2005, 2010) 
articulates  ‘nomadic strategy’ as a descriptor for such a fluid in-distinction between strategy 
and tactics. Instead of attempting to control the environment by means of plans, forecasts, or 
scenarios, the processual strategist remains on the level of everyday activity and “in step” 
with ever-unfolding reality (Jullien, 2004: 78). Similarly, the nomad finds herself continually 
on the move, muddling her way through landscapes to which she is finely attuned, exploiting 
the temporary advantages that emerge without settling in any one location. Resisting 
distinctions between strategic and tactical concerns requires an iterative process “… based on 
constant questioning, experimenting, reflecting, debugging and retesting” (Isenberg, 1987: 
96) without fixing long term plans or striving for anything more ‘proper’ (Chia & Holt, 
2009).  
 The potential efficacy of such approaches is exemplified in the success of exceptional 
organizations such as WL Gore whose revolutionary non-hierarchical and distributed style 
reflects a blurring between strategic and tactical concerns (Hamel, 2007, 2012). Other 
examples include Baker, et al.’s (2003) study of three start-up firms who utilize a series of 
tactical improvisations and, despite the owners’ ‘strategy’ glossing, remain successful in 
absence of general, explicit and longitudinal ideals. Similarly, Kolb (1983) describes how 
sustained tactics in labour mediation processes represent a strategic modus operandi, as turf 
wars that come with fixed and entrenched negotiating positions are avoided by repetitively 
getting parties to meet and (re)negotiate their claims. A further example is provided by Tardif, 
et al., (2010), who show how a manufacturer of agricultural machinery profited from adopting 
a tactical focus on taking small steps and close coupling with the environment, continually 
adjusting their management approach to local circumstances without any strategic fixing of 
the content or direction of these changes.  
The avoidance of fixed positions runs very much against the grain of the dominant 
pragmatic perspective in which decisive and heroic managerial action is realised through 
resource commitment and steadfastness when making ‘strategic choices’ (e.g. Child, 1997). 
Yet, even within the notionally pragmatic mainstream literature, we can regularly detect 
glimpses of processual thinking when it comes to preserving speed of movement when taking 
decisions (Eisenhardt 1989, 1990) or fostering abilities to react to changing circumstances in 
a concrete and fleeting tactical manner (Isenberg, 1987; Rock, 1987). Others have suggested 
that the very stipulation of decisive goals can be debilitating while freer ‘participative 
techniques’ may lead to ‘better strategies and tactics’ (Durham et al., 1997: 227). In a 
dynamic, networked society (Bauman, 2007), where official information and formal 
structures are increasingly disrupted by information warfare from actors such as governments, 
hackers, lobbyists and paid bloggers, less and less trust can be placed in proper systems to 
safeguard social, technological and biological cohesion from disintegration and 
disorganization (Munro, 2005, 2010). In acknowledging that “with every revelation comes 
concealment and with every seemingly objective claim comes an unstated and 
unacknowledged personal and collective emotional involvement” (Nonaka, et al., 2014: 367) 
a processual perspective explores strategy and tactics within the frame of a modus operandi 
that thrives on preserving and exploiting openness in the context of an ever-shifting world 
(Hjorth, 2005; Westphal & Bednar, 2008). These concerns hark back to insights by military 
historians such as Gray (2006: 77) for whom there can be no mechanical/technological 
panacea to the task of warfare which instead requires practical wisdom, making strategy as a 
practical subject whose efficacy lies in its execution. 
  Whilst being the least populated of our identified literature subsets, the processual 
perspective most directly questions the utility of the strategy-tactics distinction by elaborating 
a possible alternative which, consequently, also sidesteps problems of ‘implementation’ 
whilst minimizing the scope for others’ tactically political responses.  
Discussion and conclusions 
Our review has identified that most contributions to this literature draw pragmatic 
distinctions between strategy and tactics. These are often rooted in historical military 
hierarchies, associating strategic intelligence with rationality and abstraction at the expense of 
merely tactically concrete and non-calculative modes of operation. We contrasted this 
dominant perspective with two alternative ways of conceiving the strategy-tactics 
relationship. ‘Sociologically’, tactics present a mode of responding to strategic impositions, 
often with the aim of alleviating or circumventing the impress of the directives issued forth by 
those in power. ‘Processually’, any distinction between tactics and strategy blurs even further 
when being planless by design (Isenberg, 1987: 94) becomes a strategic advantage precisely 
because it offers no line to attack and no singular message to distort or undermine. In this 
final section we bring these three ways of conceiving of strategy-tactics distinctions into 
conversation in order to suggest further research directions in each area. 
Pragmatic distinctions have far-reaching and well-documented consequences. They 
include the recurring problems of implementing or sustaining strategic ideas when faced with 
the concreteness and immediacy of demands in the here and now as well as the hierarchical 
separation and prioritization of organizational elites over middle managers and the shop floor, 
for instance when local concerns about strategic change initiatives are read as acts of 
‘resistance’ that need to be overcome. Those struggling with the consequences of pragmatic 
distinctions between strategy and tactics can learn from the sociological perspective that it 
may be the one-sidedness of their preference for all things ‘strategic’ that lies at the core of 
many recurring conceptual and practical problems, in particular those relating to the 
implementation of strategies in organization practice (see Sull, et al., 2015). Here it may be 
helpful to elevate our appreciation of tactics. Rather than seeing them as merely subordinate 
processes, tactics can bring about powerful political opposition to directives of strategists and 
we have identified a well documented set of examples illustrates the efficacy of lobbying 
tactics (Holburn, et al., 2014), ‘strange’ idiosyncratic tactical moves (Chang & Park, 2012), or 
dissimulating tactics (Sherwood, 1990; Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Mackay et al., 2013). 
Crucially, such tactics gain more traction the more they are up against rigidly formalized, 
abstract and long-term strategies as tactical responses feed off the frictions and rigidities 
inherent in these. Proponents of pragmatic strategy-tactics distinctions may also gain from the 
accounts provided by the ‘processual’ perspective which explicitly acknowledges the 
brittleness of strategic ‘certainties’ (Valery, 1962).  Von Clausewitz (2007: 89) already 
cautioned that ‘we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model 
for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support 
at any time’; or, expressed in Sull et al.’s (2015: 61) updated version: “no Gantt chart survives 
contact with reality”.  
For the pragmatic set of literature, we consequently suggest two directions for further 
research. First, there is a need to study tactics as important units of organizational analysis. 
Sociologically inflected contributions take tactics seriously because they are interested in 
ways of practicing rather than in “any scientific status … gained through numbers, tables, and 
percentages” (Certeau, 1998: xx), and in so doing they shed light on concrete situational 
demands of organizational life. This is not the same as studying strategy-making practices 
(e.g. Jonson et al., 2003); it includes specifically those actions that are not per se considered 
to be ‘strategic’ but instead are reactive, short-term, or contextually and situationally specific, 
forming the latent background against which any strategically clear formulation can be 
delineated. Investigating such backgrounds promises to shed light on the ‘anthill-like 
structures’ (Certeau, 1998: 3) of activities that make up organizations and the various 
localized meanings and the rationales for doing things in specific ways. Paying attention to 
tactics not only helps understand the particularities of a strategic environment, but it may also 
guard a strategist against the resourcefulness and ingenuity of tacticians who, otherwise, can 
find near endless ways of subverting or redirecting strategic impulses (Scott, 1998), often 
merely to elicit further ‘strategic’ initiatives by the establishment which then equally open up 
further scope for new forms of resistance or dissimulation (e.g. Kilduff, et al., 2010; 
Timming, 2007). 
Second, we argue for more research into the process of distinction-making entailed 
when some concerns come to be called strategic and others tactical. We were surprised by the 
predominance of preference for all things ‘strategic’ in the literature we reviewed and the 
relative scarcity of contributions critically engaging with this preference. The strategy-tactics 
distinction is performative in perpetuating a separation of strategic intelligence from 
seemingly less-intelligent tactical action; organizational elites from lower echelons; stipulated 
general and long term ends over immediate and specific concerns; and what seems rationally 
logical over what may feel right or appropriate right here and now (see March, 2003). It is 
therefore paramount to investigate not just the wider politico-historical conditions that give 
rise to such a continued one-sidedness but also how everyday decisions and their 
justifications continually carve out a space for a preferred strategic mode while othering 
alternative considerations (c.f. Agamben, 2004).  
The sociological and processual perspectives provide stimulating cues to question the taken 
for granted distinction patterns. Yet, at least in their managerial incarnations, more work is 
needed to flesh out the constructive aspects of these ideas. We have seen how in particular the 
more mainstream contributions on strategy and tactics are rooted in (and are generative of) 
the everyday language and understandings of strategists in organizational settings. In contrast, 
there are only few contemporary organizational illustrations of the sociological and 
processual alterantives so far. We found instead that authors resorted to military history 
(Clausewitz, 2007), to everyday practices such as cooking (Certeau, 1998), or to Chinese 
warfare, poetry and painting (Jullien, 2000, 2004b, 2007) to illustrate that just because tactics 
may not abide by rational, calculative and abstract notions of ‘intelligence’, they nonetheless 
operate according to structures which we can study and understand. What appears to be 
missing at present is a clearer link of these ideas with contemporary examples of strategic and 
tactical manoeuvring and other forms of guerrilla warfare in organizational practice (e.g. Pech 
& Slade, 2003; McCabe, 2009). Without these links, the rich insights that may be offered by 
both sociological and processual views face the danger of being side-lined as obscure and 
arcane. This would be a pity. In a world where modern media affords impactful 
whistleblowing; where computerized stock exchanges cause chain reactions in response to 
rumours; where corporate spokespeople are rhetorical experts; and where multinational 
corporations versed at playing off diverging national regulatory frameworks and interests 
against each other, the reliance on formal, abstract and long-term strategic intelligence 
appears at times more antiquated than the bland strategies fostered by ancient Chinese 
strategists. Sociological and processual perspectives may serve as a starting point for a 
research programme that may not only come to enrich our comprehension of ‘real’ 
organizational life, but also help remove some of the artificial and problematic distinctions 
that separate thinking and doing in managerial practice.   
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Table 1 – Summary of main strategy-tactics distinctions 
  Pragmatic Sociological Processual 
Understanding 
of strategy 




Organization of social 
relations. Indicative of a 
multiplicity of strategic 
sources and positions 
that dynamically evolve. 
No fixed distinction 
between strategy and 
tactics. Continuous 
renegotiation of 
boundaries as the 
situation demands.  Understanding 
of tactics 
Immediate and executed 
under guidance of strategy. 
Usually relegated to lower 
levels of hierarchy 
Possibility of dealing 
with others’ attempts at 






distinctions, e.g. long and 
short term horizons; 
involvement of upper or 
lower hierarchical levels; 
general or local impact. 
Difference is largely a 




positions of power 
require (and sometimes 
give rise to) greater need 






Preference Preference for strategy – at 
the extreme end to replace 
(or render unnecessary) 
tactics altogether 
Balanced, as both modes 
are interdependent. 
Studies may either give 
preference to strategy 
(eg. Agency theory) or to 
tactics (e.g Certeau).  
Preferencing rejected 
- strategy and tactics 
treated as irreducible, 
parallel concepts that 
need to be explored 
in combination 
Problems Difficulty of defining 
boundaries between 
strategic and tactical 
realms 
Ideal and rational 
strategies run against 
messy tactical realities  
No position can be held 
for long; demands on 
securing; tactics may 
turn into proper places.  
Difficult to sustain; 
impossible to fortify 
positions; 
uncomfortable if not 
irrational and may be 
perceived to be 
esoteric.  
 Figure 1 – Summary of Paper Selection Process 
  
 
